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Historical Perspective on the Corporate
Interest Deduction
Steven A. Bank*
INTRODUCTION
One of the so-called “Pillars of Sand” in the American
business tax structure is the differential treatment of debt and
equity.1 Corporations may deduct interest payments on their
debt, but may not deduct dividend payments on their equity. This
“ancient and pernicious” feature is criticized because it distorts
corporate financing choices and inevitably leads to line drawing
problems as the government engages in a futile chase to catch up
with the latest financial innovation.2 In the past few years, both
the Obama administration and new Senate Finance Committee
Chairman Ron Wyden have proposed capping or substantially
reshaping the deductibility of corporate interest to “reduce
incentives to overleverage and produce more stable business
finances.”3
* Paul Hastings Professor of Business Law, UCLA School of Law.
1 DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, DECODING THE CORPORATE TAX 44, 48 (2009); Alvin C.
Warren Jr., The Corporate Interest Deduction: A Policy Evaluation, 83 YALE L.J. 1585,
1585 (1974).
2 Ilan Benshalom, How to Live with a Tax Code with Which You Disagree: Doctrine,
Optimal Tax, Common Sense, and the Debt-Equity Distinction, 88 N.C. L. REV . 1217, 1219
(2010); SHAVIRO, supra note 1, at 48–49. The controversy over the differential treatment
of debt and equity is long-standing. See, e.g., M. L. Seidman, Deductions for Interest and
Dividends, in HOW SHOULD CORPORATIONS BE TAXED? 130 (1947); NAT ’L INDUS.
CONFERENCE BD., 2 THE SHIFTING AND EFFECTS OF THE FEDERAL CORPORATION INCOME
TAX 138–41 (1930).
3 THE WHITE HOUSE & THE DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT’ S FRAMEWORK
FOR BUSINESS TAX REFORM 10 (2012) (“[R]educing the deductibility of interest for
corporations could finance lower tax rates and do more to encourage investment in the
United States.”); The Bipartisan Tax Fairness and Simplification Act of 2011, S. 727,
112th Cong. § 211 (2011) (describing the so-called “Wyden-Coats” reform plan, which
indexed the interest deduction for inflation and excluded the inflation component from the
deduction). For other proposals, see Robert C. Pozen & Lucas W. Goodman, Capping the
Deductibility of Corporate Interest Expense, 137 TAX NOTES 1207, 1207, 1209 (2012)
(proposing to limit nonfinancial companies to a deduction of 65% of gross interest paid
and to limit financial companies to a deduction of 79% of gross interest paid); Calvin H.
Johnson, Corporate Meltdowns and the Deduction of Credit-Risk Interest, 131 TAX NOTES
513, 513 (2011) (proposing to disallow the deduction of interest paid on debt in excess of
the risk-free interest, since it reflects credit risk rather than true interest). Former House
Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dave Camp and former Senate Finance
Committee chair Max Baucus also recommended considering modification of the
deductibility of interest expense as part of reform geared toward lowering the corporate
tax rate. Pozen & Goodman, supra, at 1209.
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Over the years, several commentators have attempted to
make sense of the corporate interest deduction by examining its
history or have used historical evidence to buttress their
normative arguments.4 Most recently, Jonathan Talisman, a
former Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy in the Treasury
Department under the Clinton Administration, forwarded a
historical argument that has not been raised before.5 Talisman
noted that the corporate income tax was originally conceived of
as a proxy for a tax on shareholders: “It was viewed as necessary
to reach shareholders’ intangible wealth and prevent them from
avoiding tax by keeping profits at the corporate level.”6 From
this, Talisman infers that the corporate income tax was not
intended to reach bondholder wealth, since “the corporation does
not provide a deferral shield with respect to debt. Interest
generally must be paid periodically . . . . Thus, there is no need
for a corporate proxy tax for debt to prevent deferral.”7
This Essay contends that although there may be appropriate
arguments in favor of maintaining a full corporate interest
deduction,8 the historical premise for the origins of the corporate
income tax system is not one of them. Corporate interest was
deductible both in 1894,9 when deferral was not a concern
because corporations routinely distributed all of their profits each
year,10 and in 1909,11 when there was no individual income tax
and therefore no tax incentive to retain earnings. Moreover, it is
not that Congress was indifferent to reaching bondholder wealth;
that was a major subject of the debates in both 1894 and 1909.
Rather, other priorities—including the protection of leveraged
domestic industries and concerns about the constitutionality of
targeting bondholders—took precedence. The corporate interest
deduction emerged because of expedience, not tax policy per se.
In fact, the early history of the deduction has more in
common with modern proposals to cap the interest deduction
4 See, e.g., Katherine Pratt, The Debt-Equity Distinction in a Second-Best World, 53
VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1094–98 (2000); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and
the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53, 111–12 (1990); Curtis Jay
Berger, Simple Interest and Complex Taxes, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 219–20 (1981).
5 Jonathan Talisman, Do No Harm: Keep Corporate Interest Fully Deductible, 141
TAX NOTES 211, 211 (2013).
6 Id. at 215.
7 Id. at 216.
8 Some of the arguments advocates of the deduction have raised include that it
helps facilitate capital investment, reduces business costs, and increases returns to
investors. See Marc Heller, Corporate Interest Deduction Proves Sacred Amid Reformers:
Taxes, BLOOMBERG, (May 29, 2013, 3:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-0529/corporate-interest-deduction-proves-sacred-amid-reformers-taxes.html.
9 Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556 (1894).
10 See infra text accompanying notes 28–30.
11 Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 113.
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than it does with the current system of full deductibility. In 1909,
because of the fear that shareholders could easily shift their
investment to bonds in order to disguise dividends as deductible
interest payments, the corporate interest deduction was capped.
Under the provision, interest on corporate indebtedness in excess
of the aggregate value of the corporation’s paid-up capital stock
was made non-deductible. Business lobbying began to chip away
at this limitation in the post-Sixteenth Amendment revenue acts.
In 1913 and 1916, the cap on corporate interest deductions was
raised to the value of the capital stock plus one-half the amount
of outstanding debt.12 The cap was not lifted entirely until 1918,13
when it was done so to offset the exclusion of debt from the
definition of invested capital in the war and excess profits tax.
Much like today, these early capped interest deduction provisions
were an attempt to strike a balance between concerns about the
inefficiencies of the debt/equity distinction and concerns about
overburdening businesses in industries in which debt financing
was a necessity.
Part I of this Essay will discuss the nineteenth century
origins of the corporate interest deduction, adopted amid
controversy over the nature of income in the early income tax
statutes. Part II will focus on the adoption of a deduction in the
1909 corporate excise tax. It will explore the debates over
reaching bondholder wealth, which eventually led to the
insertion of a cap on the amount of the deduction. In Part III, the
Essay will examine the continuation of the capped interest
deduction in the first two post-Sixteenth Amendment revenue
acts of 1913 and 1916, before the cap was ultimately lifted during
World War I. The Essay will conclude by offering some reflections
on the historical basis for modern proposals.
I.
The deductibility of interest on corporate debt was
controversial as far back as the first attempt to impose an
entity-level income tax on corporations in 1894. Although it is
almost taken as a given today that interest is a deductible
business expense, while dividends represent a non-deductible
return on ownership,14 the matter was far less settled at the end
12 Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § 2(G)(b), 38 Stat. 114, 173; Revenue Act of 1916, ch.
463, § 12(a)(3), 39 Stat. 765, 768.
13 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 234(a)(2), 40 Stat. 1057, 1077 (1919).
14 See Adam O. Emmerich, Comment, Hybrid Instruments and the Debt-Equity
Distinction in Corporate Taxation, 52 U. CHI . L. REV. 118, 122 (1985) (“Apparently, the
idea that interest payments are deductible as an ordinary business expense is so
intuitively appealing that Congress has thought it unnecessary to explain section 163(a)
or its predecessors.”).
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of the nineteenth century. According to contemporary economist
Edwin Seligman, who has been described as one of the “pivotal
historical figures” in nineteenth century American public
finance,15 “the most advanced tax laws in America, as well as in
Europe, permit an individual to deduct his indebtedness or the
interest on his debts, while the corporation is assessed on both
bonds and stock, or on both interest and dividends.”16 The reason
for this, Seligman explained, is:
[T]here is a distinction between individual income and corporate
income. In the case of individuals, true taxable property consists in
the surplus above indebtedness. Net income can therefore be arrived
at only by deducting interest on debts. But in the case of corporations
the matter is somewhat different. Capital stock represents in many
cases only a portion of the property, the remainder being represented
by the bonded indebtedness. It is the stock and bonds together that
represent the property and the earning capacity of the corporations. 17

Such theoretical distinctions may have been influential, but
there were practical considerations that favored denying a
deduction for corporate interest. In his State of the Union
address in 1893, President Grover Cleveland suggested levying
“a small tax upon incomes derived from certain corporate
investments” to replace revenues lost as part of tariff reform.18 It
was clear that he intended to reach income from bonds as well as
stocks when, in an address before Congress, Treasury Secretary
John Carlisle subsequently proposed a tax on incomes “derived
from investments in stocks and bonds of corporations and joint
stock companies” in order to “most conveniently and justly”
replace the shortfall caused by Cleveland’s proposed tariff
reform.19
Eventually, Cleveland’s proposal morphed into a corporate
income tax proposal as policymakers sought to harness the
corporation as a mechanism for taxing income at the source.20
This meant that both dividends and interest would be taxed at
the source as well. Thus, noted lawyer and political economist
Thomas Shearman testified before a House subcommittee in
15 AJAY K. MEHROTRA , MAKING THE MODERN AMERICAN FISCAL STATE: LAW,
POLITICS, AND THE R ISE OF PROGRESSIVE TAXATION, 1877–1929, at 98–99 (2013).
16 EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX 513 (2d ed. 1914).
17 Id.
18 President Grover Cleveland, First Annual Message, in A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS , 1789–1897, at 434, 460 (1899).
19 SIDNEY RATNER, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 174 (1980) (quoting
TREASURY REPORT 83 (1893)).
20 This was partly a reaction to concerns about the inquisitorial nature of the
administration of the income tax during the Civil War and Reconstruction. See, e.g.,
David A. Wells, An Income Tax: Is It Desirable?, 17 F. 1, 3 (1893); William L. Wilson, The
Income Tax on Corporations, 158 N. AM. L. REV. 1 (1894).
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favor of an entity-level tax on corporate dividends and interest,
plus all net income from corporate monopolies.21 According to
Shearman, one of the greatest virtues of a tax on corporations
was that “dividends upon stock and interest upon the bonds of
corporations, and, in general, all income which is in any way paid
through corporations” can be ascertained and taxed “without
requiring a single return from the persons receiving such
income.”22 Shearman noted that “every government which
collects an income tax at all makes it a prime object to collect
that tax as far as possible through the medium of corporations,
requiring them to deduct the tax from all dividends and interest
paid.”23 Not surprisingly given these origins, the House bill in
1894 did not permit a deduction for corporate interest.
A corporate interest deduction was only added in the Senate
bill in 1894.24 The bill’s sponsor, Senator George Vest, a
Democrat from Missouri, explained that
[i]f the provision in the bill as it came from the other House had been
retained, which put a 2 per cent tax upon the bonded indebtedness of
corporations, we should have heard from the other side of this
Chamber and from this side such a protest as never was heard before
in Congress in regard to a tax law. 25

Apparently, the House bill had provoked much outrage on this
point, with heavily leveraged railroads claiming that the inability
to deduct the interest expense risked leaving them “in ruin.”26
Nevertheless, Seligman argued that because of this concession,
“the definition of ‘income’ was certainly an uneconomic one; and
that whatever arguments apply to the advisability of making
corporations responsible for the tax on dividends apply with
equal force to the interest on indebtedness.”27
Notwithstanding Seligman’s objections, the distinction
between the treatment of debt and equity in the 1894 Act was
likely not viewed to be very significant at the time. During this
period, the notion that corporations would defer dividends to
shield them from taxation would have been considered quite
foreign. As Republican Senator William Boyd Allison of Iowa
noted during the debates, “as to the great body of the
corporations of our country they make dividends covering

21 53 CONG. REC . 11, 12 (1893) (statement of Hon. Thomas G. Shearman before Ways
and Means Subcommittee on Internal Revenue).
22 Id. at 7.
23 Id. at 11.
24 26 CONG. REC. 6867 (1894) (statement of Sen. George Vest).
25 Id.
26 SELIGMAN, supra note 16, at 513.
27 Id.
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practically [all] their earnings each year.”28 Similarly, William
Ripley explained that outside of the railroad industry, “it was the
common practice [in the nineteenth century] to divide all profits
in sight and to finance new construction by the issue of
securities. Such policies were fully sanctioned by the public
opinion of the day.”29 This was in part because, in the absence of
robust stock markets or readily available financial information,
dividends provided an important signal about the stability and
value of a company, and they were the sole source of liquidity for
most shareholders.30 In such an environment, there would not
have been concern about a corporate retained earnings deferral
shield that would have necessitated an entity-level tax on
dividends, but not interest.
II.
The controversy over the interest deduction continued when
income taxation was revisited in 1909. The corporate excise tax
was supposed to reach the “great accumulated wealth of the
country, or its earnings, engaged in corporate enterprise,” which
meant that it was a proxy for taxing shareholders and
bondholders, rather than just the former.31 Therefore, the
possibility that wealth represented by bond interests would be
excluded from the tax was considered problematic. The New York
World reported “[t]here were indications to-day of growing
opposition to the corporation tax plan. This was chiefly because
Senators believed bondholders might escape payment of the tax
while the small holders of stock would contribute all the
revenue.”32 The difficulty was that in the absence of an individual
income tax as a backstop to the corporation tax, an interest
deduction meant that “the ‘bloated bondholder’ . . . escapes
altogether . . . . Multimillionaires like Mr. Carnegie, whose
wealth is mostly in bonded investments, go free, while the owner
of no more than one share of stock in any paying corporation is
taxed.”33 Similarly, insurgent Republicans argued that it was
“manifestly unfair to single out corporations whose lists of
26 CONG. REC. 6869 (1894).
WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, RAILROADS: FINANCE AND ORGANIZATION 244 (1915); see
STEVEN A. BANK, FROM SWORD TO SHIELD: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE CORPORATE
INCOME TAX, 1861 TO PRESENT 51 fig. 2 (2010) (the dividend payout ratio for public
corporations was approximately 80% between 1871 and 1895).
30 STEVEN A. BANK, ANGLO-AMERICAN CORPORATE TAXATION: TRACING THE COMMON
ROOTS OF DIVERGENT APPROACHES 108–112, 117–18 (2011).
31 44 CONG. REC. 3756 (1909) (statement of Sen. Francis Newlands, D-NV.).
32 Taft’s Corporation Tax Framed to Reach the Rich, N.Y. WORLD, June 18, 1909, at
5B.
33 Is Corporate Taxation Just, and Will It Aid the Revenues?, WALL ST. J., June 26,
1909, at 6.
28
29
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stockholders include men of nearly every degree of poverty, while
wealthy bondholders will be exempt.”34 One constituent wrote a
letter to Senator Joseph Bristow of Kansas asking, “[D]oes the
proposition reach the very wealthiest citizens, such as
Rockefeller and Carnegie, whose holdings are not in stocks of
corporations, but in bonds?”35 Senator Moses Clapp of Minnesota
answered, complaining that it “absolutely exempts the man who
has gone still further in the process of accumulation and has laid
his accumulated savings in the form of bonds.”36 Senator Albert
Cummins of Iowa echoed this point, observing, “I do not wonder
that a man like Harriman should favor this measure rather than
the general income tax; because the part of his great fortune,
which has been segregated from the corporations in which he is
interested, lies beyond the operation of this law.”37 There were
complaints that this inequity would not only play out on the
investor level, but on the entity level. As one individual
complained in a letter to the editor of The Washington Post,
“[H]eavily bonded concerns doing business in competition with
those with little or no funded debt would practically escape
taxation, an obviously inequitable advantage.”38
Originally, it appears that the Administration and its
supporters in the Senate had approached the problem as a
drafting exercise, proposing to solve it through more precise
language. According to one report, they used the phrase “net
income,” rather than “net earnings” or “net profit,” in the
statutory language to avoid the over-bonding issue.39 Apparently,
courts and businessmen had disagreed about the interpretation
of the latter two phrases, leaving open the possibility that they
would exclude from the tax base such “fixed charges” as interest
on bonds and dividends on preferred stock.40 The New York
World reported that “the ‘net income’ of a corporation, as
Insurgents’ Fight Will Hold Congress, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1909, at 2.
44 CONG. REC. 4036 (1909) (read by Sen. Joseph Bristow, R-KS).
Id. (statement of Sen. Clapp); see id. at 4036 (statement of Sen. Bristow, R-KS)
(favoring an income tax because “[i]t would then include the bondholders and those who
have large fortunes that are not reached by this tax. It would more equitably distribute
the burden as to population than this corporation tax.”).
37 Id. at 4038 (statement of Sen. Cummins); see The President Takes a Hand,
LAFOLLETTE’S WKLY. MAG., June 26, 1909, at 13, 14 (“They [Senators Borah and Bristow]
could see no reason, however, for exempting from taxation the vast incomes of individuals
like Carnegie and Rockefeller, only a part of whose fortunes are in the form of corporation
stocks.”).
38 Letter to the Editor, Reaping the Whirlwind: Proposed Corporation Tax Strikes a
Deadly Blow at Protection, WASH. POST, June 21, 1909, at D6.
39 See Taft’s Corporation Tax Framed to Reach the Rich, supra note 32.
40 Id.; Editorial, Earnings, Profit, Income, N.Y. TIMES , June 23, 1909, at 6. Under the
1894 Act, corporations were taxed on their “net profits or income” and bond interest was
explicitly made deductible. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 556. The text of the
statute may be found in BANK, supra note 30, at 40.
34
35
36
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interpreted by the president, Secretary Knox, Attorney-General
Wickersham, Senator Root and Secretary Nagel, all lawyers of
high standing, is all the money the corporation has made outside
its operating expenses.”41 The drafters distinguished, however,
between operating expenses, which were deductible, and fixed
charges, which were not. “For instance, the tax must be paid by a
railroad before the railroad board sets aside any of the gross
earnings for improvements, sinking fund, dividends on preferred
stock or interest on its bonds.”42
Requiring corporations to pay interest with post-tax money,
however, was also controversial. The New York Times reported
that “[t]he important point, which threatens to cause a real
division among the [Senate Finance] committee members, is the
question of taxing that part of a corporation’s earnings set aside
for the payment of interest on bonds.”43 The dissension spilled
outside the committee room. Thus, for example, Republican
Senator Stephen Elkins of West Virginia reportedly spent more
than an hour discussing the reasons for his opposition to the
proposed corporation tax in a meeting with President Taft,
including the inequity of failing to “distinguish between capital
and capital stock, as some corporations raised all their capital by
bond issues and had very little stock.”44 Similarly, a group of
Progressive senators issued a statement declaring that “[t]here is
no reason for exempting from this tax the vast incomes of
individuals like Carnegie, Rockefeller, and others, a very large
part of whose fortunes do not consist of corporation stock.”45
According to The New York Times, the dispute was largely along
regional lines.
The division here, it is understood, is somewhat geographical, the
Eastern Senators being as a general thing opposed to taxing any
money connected with bonds, while the Westerners are said to be in
favor of finding a way to tax such fortunes as that of Andrew
Carnegie, which consists almost entirely of bond holdings. 46

Even among the provision’s supporters there were concerns
about the constitutionality of taxing bond interest. In part, this
related to the so-called “tax-free covenants” on many corporate
bonds, which had been utilized by railroads and many larger
industrial corporations to assuage bondholder concerns about the
effects of income taxation after their experience with the Civil

41
42
43
44
45
46

Taft’s Corporation Tax Framed to Reach the Rich, supra note 32.
Id.
Taft Plan for Tax Splits Committee, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1909, at 5.
Rush of Objections to Taft Tax Plan, N.Y. T IMES, June 22, 1909, at 1.
Oppose Taft Plan, WASH. POST, June 17, 1909, at 1F.
Taft Plan for Tax Splits Committee, supra note 43.

Do Not Delete

2014]

10/13/2014 2:28 PM

The Corporate Interest Deduction

37

War-era tax.47 Under the 1864 Act, companies were required to
pay a five percent tax on interest payments, but were authorized
to deduct the tax from those interest payments.48 In practice,
however, most corporations chose to bear the tax on interest
themselves and they were permitted to do so under the original
Civil War-era provisions.49 Bondholders sought to ensure the
continuation of that practice by inserting tax-free covenants in
their bonds. Under the covenants, corporations promised to pay
principal and interest “without deduction for any tax or taxes
which the company may be required or permitted to pay thereon,
or to retain therefrom, under any present or future law of the
United States or of any state, county or municipality therein.”50
Given the existence of these tax-free covenants, one objection
to the proposal to tax corporations without permitting a
deduction for interest is that the entity-level tax would require
that corporations reduce the amount of interest by the tax due,
which could be construed as unconstitutionally impairing a
contract.51 The response was that the interest could be
distributed and then taxed to the bondholder, but this could
violate the constitutional prohibition on income taxation in
Pollock, which the proposed corporate excise tax had sought to
elide.52 Moreover, if the interest was paid at the pre-set amount
despite being subject to tax at the corporate level, there were
objections that it would effectively
amount to a double tax. In the first place, the tax would be levied on
the interest fund itself . . . . [And in the second place, since] in order to
replenish the interest fund by the amount paid to the government for
taxation on it, the proportion of net income to be devoted to paying
dividends to stockholders would be curtailed by the amount of the tax
on the interest fund. 53

There was some thought given to trying to impose a more
narrowly tailored withholding tax on interest paid to bondholders
as a way to equalize the treatment of debt and equity, but

47 SELIGMAN, supra note 16, at 695; A.C. Rearick, Simplification of the Federal
Income Tax, PROC. ANN. CONF. ON TAX’N UNDER AUSPICES NAT’L TAX ASS’N, 1914, at 298,
303–05.
48 Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, §§ 120, 122, 13 Stat. 223. The text of the statute may
be found in THE STATUTES AT LARGE, TREATIES , AND PROCLAMATIONS , OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA FROM DECEMBER 1863, TO DECEMBER 1865, at 283–85 (George P.
Sanger ed., 1866).
49 Edwin R. A. Seligman, The Income Tax, 9 POL. SCI . Q. 610, 628–29 (1894);
Rearick, supra note 47, at 303–04.
50 Rearick, supra note 47, at 303.
51 Taft Plan for Tax Splits Committee, supra note 43.
52 Id.
53 Taft is to Fix Tax, WASH. POST, June 22, 1909, at 1F.
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President Taft later conceded that this idea was scuttled because
of constitutional concerns:
[T]he defect was fully recognized by those who drafted the corporation
tax. They would have been glad if possible to impose a tax upon the
bondholders who are only less interested in the earnings and success
of the corporations than are stockholders, but the difficulty of
including them and of collecting from the corporation before the
payment of interest on the bonds an income tax proportionate to a
percentage of interest to be paid on the bonds was that Congress could
not use a corporation to recoup itself in the payment of such a tax
from the interest to be paid, because thus to impose a tax on the
bondholders proportioned to the interest he received would be in
violation of the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court as
an income tax not apportioned among the States.54

Given these obstacles, it was not surprising that The Washington
Post reported that “[t]he proposition to tax corporation funds put
aside for the purpose of paying interest on bonds has been
abandoned.”55
Although taxing bond interest was off the table, the fight
was not over. The concern was that because of the different
treatment of debt and equity, corporations and investors would
take advantage of the relative fungibility of the different
instruments and evade the tax by substituting bonds for stocks.56
Senator Augustus Bacon, a Democrat from Georgia, noted during
the debates over the bill that it was a frequent occurrence that
the owners of a corporation owning stock convert that stock into
bonds, and therefore under that conversion, instead of paying
dividends upon stock they pay interest on bonds, and the exact
amount which would have been paid upon dividends is diverted to the
payment of the bonds, which stand in the place of the stock which has
thus been converted.57

Bacon noted, “I have seen in the papers, for instance, that one of
our great transcontinental railroads is now engaged in that very
process of converting stock into bonds.”58 Similarly, The Wall
Street Journal reported that
Taft Defends Tax on Corporations, N.Y. TIMES , Sept. 22, 1909, at 7.
Taft Is to Fix Tax, supra note 53.
ROY G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 46 (1940). The
fact that the spread between stock yields and bond yields was relatively small may have
contributed to the perception of fungibility, although the equivalence could also have been
ensured through the drafting of the instruments. In 1909, the average yield of American
railroad bonds varied between a low of 3.605 and a high of 3.727, while common stock
yields (the actual dividends paid in a year divided by the average of the monthly stock
values) averaged 4.31. See U.S. DEP ’T OF COMMERCE, H ISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE
UNITED STATES 1789-1945, at 280 (1949).
57 44 CONG. REC. 4007 (1909) (statement of Sen. Bacon).
58 Id.
54
55
56
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the United States Steel Corporation converted $250,000,000 of its
preferred seven per cent stock into bonds bearing five per cent
interest. It is argued that if this corporation would thus convert stock
into bonds then it could do so now, and that other corporations
existing under similar state laws and liberal charters could do
likewise, and thus convert net earnings into fixed charges and avoid
the payment of taxes on net earnings as contemplated in the
recommendations of the President.59

Because of this concern, at a dinner Taft held for members of the
Senate Finance Committee to convince them to back the
corporation tax, “the senators told the president that it would be
necessary to find some way to prevent corporations from so
manipulating their stocks and bonds as to evade their tax on
earnings.”60
The compromise to this thin corporations problem was to
permit corporations to deduct interest, but to cap the amount of
the deduction to an amount of bonds equal to the par value of the
corporation’s capital stock.61 Senator Elihu Root, a Republican
from New York who was one of the principal drafters of the bill,
explained that
[a]s we found that the bonded indebtedness of the corporations of the
country does not vary very much from the capital stock as it is now,
we thought that the simplest and most efficacious way to prevent any
abuse on any considerable scale would be to introduce into the
measure the limitation . . . not permitting the corporation to deduct
from its gross income any amount assignable to the payment of
interest upon indebtedness in excess of the amount of its capital
stock.62

Root’s theory was that the cap would generally limit bonded
indebtedness from growing beyond its existing one-to-one status
with capital stock.

Taxation of Net Earnings, WALL ST. J., June 19, 1909, at 8.
Taft Banquets Senate Finance Committeemen, L.A. HERALD, June 21, 1909, at 1.
Rush of Objections to Taft Tax Plan, N.Y. TIMES , June 22, 1909, at 1; Berger,
supra note 4, at 220; Michael Asimow, Principle and Prepaid Interest, 16 UCLA L. REV .
36, 63 n.130 (1968). According to Marjorie Kornhauser, there was no deduction for
interest in the June 17 draft, but by the June 21 draft it had been added. Kornhauser,
supra note 4, at 111. Some taxpayer corporations attempted to argue that the value of the
deduction should be tied to the total amount paid to the corporation even if it was in
excess of par value, but this was rejected by the courts. See N.Y., New Haven & Hartford
R.R. Co. v. United States, 269 F. 907, 909 (2d Cir. 1920).
62 44 CONG. REC. 4007 (1909) (Statement of Sen. Root). Recent empirical studies
suggest that the cap was effective, insofar as the average amount of corporate debt
financing did not appreciably change before and after the adoption of the corporate excise
tax in 1909 and the individual income tax in 1913. See generally Leonce Bargeron et al.,
Taxes, Investment, and Capital Structure: A Study of U.S. Firms in the Early 1900 S (Mar.
13, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2408490.
59
60
61
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The cap also reflected Congress’s concern about the practice
of over-leveraging. For corporations that already had outstanding
indebtedness in excess of the par value of their paid-up capital
stock or were tempted to incur such sizable debt obligations, the
cap would serve as a dividing line between legitimate and what
might have then been considered excessive business debt. New
York practitioner George Holmes offered this explanation in his
prominent income tax treatise:
In limiting the amount of interest which a corporation could deduct
under [the 1909 law,] Congress evidently had in view the fact that
some corporations carry a current indebtedness exceeding the amount
of paid up capital stock and with respect to such corporations intended
to limit the interest deduction to so much of the indebtedness as did
not exceed the capital. It appears that Congress deemed that where
the indebtedness exceeded that capital it should no longer be treated
as an incident, but should be considered as a principal object of the
corporate activities, and that the operations of such a corporation
were conducted more for the benefit of the creditors than of the
stockholders.63

In effect, this suggests that Congress viewed excessive amount of
debt, or debt that exceeded a corporation’s capital stock, as no
longer constituting an ordinary and necessary incident of
business as other deductible expenses.
There was some concern that corporations could evade this
limitation by increasing their authorized capital stock with
meaningless “watered stock,” which prompted drafters to define
the cap in terms of “paid-up capital stock” so as to make this
evasion technique costly.64 Thus, the bill provided that “[s]uch
net income shall be ascertained by deducting from the gross
amount of the income of such corporation . . . [i]nterest actually
paid within the year on its bonded or other indebtedness
not exceeding
the
paid-up
capital
stock
of
such
corporation . . . outstanding at the close of the year.”65
Progressives and insurgents did not consider the cap to be a
satisfactory compromise, with Senator Clapp calling the
treatment of bonds under the corporate tax “badly defective”66
and still complaining that it “exempts the man with the great
fortune who has invested his millions in bonds,”67 but it
nevertheless passed in the final act.68
GEORGE E. HOLMES, FEDERAL INCOME TAX 855 (1920).
44 CONG. REC. 4008 (1909) (colloquy between Sens. Bacon and Root).
Corporate Tax Bill Laid Before Senate, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1909, at 2.
44 CONG. REC. 4009–10 (1909) (statement of Sen. Clapp).
Id.
Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38(3), 36 Stat. 11, 114. The cap on deductibility of
corporate interest was subsequently challenged in court, but ultimately upheld. Flint v.
63
64
65
66
67
68
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III.
A.
In 1909, there had been little concern about the deferral
shield, or the possibility that earnings would be retained by the
corporation to permit shareholders to evade the personal income
tax, because there was no individual income tax. Starting with
the enactment of the first post-Sixteenth Amendment income tax
in 1913, however, this was theoretically a legitimate concern and
one means of reconciling the differential tax treatment of debt
and equity. Nevertheless, a cap on the interest deduction
remained in place.
During the Senate Finance Committee Hearings on the
proposed revenue bill in 1913, several interest groups submitted
statements complaining about the retention of the cap on the
deductibility of corporate interest that had been adopted in 1909.
J.T. Clark, speaking on behalf of corporations owning real estate,
argued that the cap systematically disadvantaged such
corporations due to the fact that
real estate is mortgaged for two-thirds of its value . . . . Therefore, if
its capitalization equals the amount of its equity in the property,
which is most frequently the case, its capitalization is only one-half of
the amount of its mortgage indebtedness, so that under the operation
of the pending bill a company will be permitted to deduct only one-half
of the actual interest it is obliged to pay during the year, because of
this illogical provision in the bill.69

Clark contrasted this with the situation in most other large
interstate corporations where the capital stock generally exceeds
the corporation’s indebtedness.70 Thus, “large corporations with
millions of bonds outstanding are permitted to deduct all the
Stone Tracy, 220 U.S. 107, 151–52, 173–74 (1911) (upholding the corporate excise tax
itself, but also commenting on the capped interest deduction: “Again, it is urged that
Congress exceeded its power in permitting a deduction to be made of interest payments
only in case of interest paid by banks and trust companies on deposits, and interest
actually paid within the year on its bonded or other indebtedness to an amount of such
bonded and other indebtedness not exceeding the paid-up capital stock of the corporation
or company. This provision may have been inserted with a view to prevent corporations
from issuing a large amount of bonds in excess of the paid-up capital stock, and thereby
distributing profits so as to avoid the tax. In any event, we see no reason why this method
of ascertaining the deductions allowed should invalidate the act. Such details are not
wholly arbitrary, and were deemed essential to practical operation. Courts cannot
substitute their judgment for that of the legislature. In such matters a wide range of
discretion is allowed.”); see also Anderson v. Forty-Two Broadway Co., 239 U.S. 69, 73
(1915) (upholding the cap); Realty Company Loses, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1915, at 19.
69 Memorandum in Relation to Amendment Sought to Pending Income-Tax
Bill: Hearing on H.R. 3321 Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 63d Cong. 2078–79 (1913)
(statement of J.T. Clark).
70 Id. at 2080.
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interest which they pay on their bonds,” while, according to
Clark, the small corporation that owns the buildings leased by
the large corporations, “is penalized by being unable to deduct
from the rents paid it by the large corporations the full amount of
the interest which it has been obliged to pay to its mortgagee.”71
Walker D. Hines submitted a brief on behalf of a number of
railroad interests that also argued against the interest deduction
cap. Hines argued that the concern that corporations would
evade the 1909 tax by heavily capitalizing themselves with debt
no longer existed in 1913 because “under the income tax law, the
persons who receive the interest will pay the tax thereon . . . and
hence the loss of revenue which was anticipated under the
corporation excise tax law will not be realized under the income
tax law.”72 Moreover, Hines contended that the possibility of
using leverage to evade the income tax was minimal due to the
bankruptcy risk of heavy leverage and due to the fact that
[a]t the present time no corporation can put forward any bond with
the hope that it will be attractive unless the bond contains a provision
supposed to mean that the interest will be paid free of any tax which
may be required to be paid or deducted at the source.73

At the same time, the issue of reaching bondholder wealth
was still prominent in policy discussions. The bill’s authors
reportedly designed the measure to “reach the rich man and be
effective in equalization of taxation.”74 At the time, Andrew
Carnegie was in the news for reportedly retiring with $213
million worth of bonds in the newly formed United States Steel
Corporation, all of which would be exempt from taxation under
New York state property law after paying a one-time recording
tax.75 Moreover, beyond the sensationalism of individual massive
bond wealth was the reality that corporation bonds were an
important part of corporate financing at this time, with the gross
amount of corporate bonds outstanding equaling $17.4 billion in
Id.
Some Suggestions and Comments, on Behalf of Certain Railroad Companies,
Relative to the Provisions of the Income Tax Section of H.R. 3321, Regulating the
Ascertainment of the Net Income of Corporations: Hearing on H.R. 3321 Before the S.
Comm. on Finance, 63d Cong. 2058–59 (1913) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of
Walker D. Hines). Indeed, the existence of the income tax led Hines to point out that the
cap would result in double taxation on the non-deductible portion of the interest. Id. at
2060; see also Letter to the Editor, Double Income Taxation, N.Y. TIMES , May 17, 1913, at
10.
73 Hearings, supra note 72, at 2062.
74 Taxes Piled Up in Succession Under Operation of Income Bill, WALL ST. J., June
20, 1913, at 1.
75 Financial News for the Investor, AM. REV. REVIEWS, July–Dec. 1913, at 126. New
York’s so-called “secured debt” exemption only added to the confusion among investors
trying to understand the tax consequences of holding bonds at this time. See Bonds and
Taxes, MUNSEY’S MAG., Apr.–Sept. 1913, at 421, 423.
71
72
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1913, compared to only $5.6 billion in combined tax-exempt
federal and state bonds.76
Ultimately, Congress elected to raise the interest cap rather
than eliminate it. In the Senate Finance Committee, the ceiling
on deduction of interest was increased from an amount equal to
the paid-up capital stock to an amount “not exceeding one-half of
the sum of its interest bearing indebtedness and its paid-up
capital stock outstanding at the close of the year.”77 There was
some confusion about the construction of this clause. Treasury
initially interpreted this to mean that the capital stock and the
debt should be added together and then cut in half to arrive at
the amount of debt for which interest may be deducted.78
Corporations were even instructed to calculate their interest this
way on their returns.79 Nevertheless, Treasury soon changed its
stance and issued a ruling to explain that it would construe the
language as the paid up capital stock, plus one-half of the
outstanding debt.80 This confusion only underscores the
arbitrariness of the number chosen for the ceiling on the interest
deduction. Seligman called it a compromise ”more favorable to
the corporations than was the excise tax,” but one that was
“entirely arbitrary. Either there should have been no deduction
at all, or the deduction should have been permitted on all the
indebtedness which might be regarded as a result of purely
consumption credit.”81
B.
After 1913, Congress was subjected to “several years of
intensive lobbying by corporate interests” on the subject of the
corporate interest deduction.82 Some argued that the interest cap
was hard to justify in a post-Sixteenth Amendment world.
Representative J. Swagar Sherley, a Democrat from Kentucky,
asked Chairman Cordell Hull whether the Ways and Means
Committee “had considered the simplification of the law by
providing that the corporation should do as individuals do, and
that all interest paid should be considered as an expense of doing
business.”83 As Sherley explained, “I can see why, when you do
76 GEORGE E. LENT, THE OWNERSHIP OF TAX-EXEMPT SECURITIES, 1913–1953, at 10
tbl. 1 (1955).
77 Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § 2(G), 38 Stat. 114, 173; BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note
56, at 84.
78 New Income Tax Returns Necessary from Corporations, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21,
1914, at 1.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 1, 7; T.D. 1960, 16 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 43 (1914).
81 SELIGMAN, supra note 16, at 685.
82 Berger, supra note 4, at 221 n.32.
83 53 CONG. REC. 10,656 (1916) (statement of Sen. Sherley).
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not tax individuals but only tax corporations, you should have a
particular provision touching interest payments. But now you are
taxing both the corporation and the individual . . . .”84 Railroad
lawyer Alfred Thom echoed these sentiments in a brief he
submitted to the Senate Finance Committee during the
consideration of the 1916 Act:
It is difficult to appreciate the reason for any arbitrary limitation on
interest in calculating net income as would be the case in any expense
incident to the business, and no satisfactory reason has been assigned.
The present provision has apparently been taken over from the old
corporation excise law without consideration of the effect of the
establishment of a net income tax on individuals. 85

One impetus for change was the continuing perception that
the cap on the deductibility of interest payments was effectively
hitting either common stockholders with a second or third layer
of tax or consumers in the form of higher prices, rather than
reaching bondholder wealth. This was partly due to the
continued presence of tax-free covenants and other structural
features of the bond instruments that prevented corporations
from factoring in the deductibility cap into previously issued
bonds. Harvard Economics Professor Charles Bullock wrote that
“[a]t present the average corporation is obliged to assume
payment of the ordinary tax upon bond interest . . . . It therefore
comes about, if the tax is not shifted, that the holders of common
stock may be taxed at two or three times the ordinary rate.”86
These tax-free covenants had expanded far beyond the original
confines of those enacted as a result of the Civil War-era income
tax:
The language of the typical “tax-free” clause, however, framed at the
instance of creditors who demanded protection against every possible
contingency in the premises, is, in its usual form, so broad as
apparently to comprehend not only an excise tax upon the business of
the corporation deductible against its security-holders but a tax like
the present income tax which is levied, not upon the corporation, but
upon the recipient of the interest, and which solely, as a means of
collection, the corporation is required to withhold and to pay to the
Id.
Brief of Alfred P. Thom in Regard to the Duplicate Taxation of the Holders of
Common Stock by the Pending Revenue Act, in BRIEFS AND STATEMENTS FILED WITH THE
COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, UNITED STATES SENATE, 64TH CONG., 1ST SESS., ON H.R. 16763
75, 76 (1916).
86 Charles J. Bullock, Financing the War, 31 Q.J. ECON. 357, 374 (1917); see W. Elliot
Brownlee, Wilson and Financing the Modern State: The Revenue Act of 1916, 129 PROC.
AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 173, 197 (1985) (describing practice of tax-free covenants). But see Roy G.
Blakey, Amending the Federal Income Tax, 58 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 32, 38
n.4 (1915) (arguing that the tax burden was properly on corporations or shareholders
because the tax burden was built in to the higher price the corporation received for the
bond).
84
85
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government . . . . The result has been a tax which Congress intended
to levy upon the income-receiver has, in this case, been shifted to the
income-producer. It thus falls not upon the “swollen fortune” which it
is the professed purpose of this act particularly to reach, but primarily
upon the corporation and finally upon the unfortunate “ultimate
consumer” who was supposed already to be more than sufficiently
taxed.87

This meant that one argument for differentiating between the
cap in 1909 and the cap post-1913—that the individual income
tax would ensure that bondholders paid their fair share of tax on
the interest payments—may not have been entirely accurate. In
effect, permitting the corporation to deduct interest payments
may have become a way to ensure the corporation (or its
stockholders, customers, or whoever bore the ultimate burden)
would not pay the tax twice, since its bondholders were already
being spared one layer of tax as a result of the covenants.88
In 1916, Congress was not ready to abandon the cap
completely, but it was willing to further the effort begun in 1913
to raise it. Thus, a bill was introduced to permit corporations to
deduct interest on an amount of debt equal to twice its capital
stock. As Chairman Hull explained, this was once again a
compromise relating to concerns about the fungibility of debt and
equity:
[T]he original theory of the matter was that corporations could issue
quite a lot of watered stock, transfer that into bonds, mortgage their
property, and incur interest, and make a great many shifts in many
ways that would result in avoiding the real purpose of the law. This
bill allows them to deduct interest on an amount of indebtedness
double their capital stock.89

As Hull explained, “[t]he original provision was modified, but it
was not thrown wide open.”90
Congress did not adopt the same cap proposed in the House
bill, but it did employ language to ratify the more generous
interpretation employed by Treasury starting in 1914. Thus,
under the Revenue Act of 1916, it revised the statutory language
to make clear that corporations were permitted to deduct the
interest on an amount of debt equal to the paid-up capital stock

Rearick, supra note 47, at 304.
The Senate Finance Committee in 1916 also sought to ameliorate the problem by
prohibiting tax-free covenants for future bond issuances, but ultimately simply barred the
deductibility of income tax payments made as a result of such guarantees. See Brownlee,
supra note 86, at 201; see also Cedric A. Major, The Revised Federal Income Tax Law, 2
CORNELL L.Q. 73, 87 (1917).
89 53 CONG. REC. 10,656 (1916) (statement of Sen. Hull).
90 Id.
87
88

Do Not Delete

46

10/13/2014 2:28 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 18:1

and one-half the outstanding indebtedness.91 While this fell far
short of the critics’ arguments for repeal, it laid the groundwork
for a push to eliminate the cap completely a few years later.
The entry of the United States into the war and the adoption
of war and excess profits taxes in 1917 had complicated the
question of the corporate interest deduction. In its definition of
an “invested capital” base upon which to measure “excess profits”
and “war profits” for purposes of levying a tax, Congress had
omitted most borrowed funds.92 The New York Times argued that
this was inequitable since “all funds used in business, and at the
risk of business, are capital for that purpose in an economic
sense.”93 The Times suggested that “[a] small step toward solving
the problem would be to remove, or at least to enlarge, the limit
upon the allowance deductible for interest before calculating the
tax.”94 As George Holmes explained, the interest cap’s
arbitrary limitation resulted in the creation of a fictitious income on
which the corporation was taxed, and since such fictitious income not
only was subject to a heavy income tax but entered very materially
into the computation of an extraordinarily heavy excess profits tax,
the provision operated with rank injustice in the case of corporations
which had an indebtedness greatly in excess of their capital stock.95

In 1918, the House Ways and Means Committee used similar
reasoning in a report recommending a repeal of the cap96: “Since
borrowed money is not allowed to be included in computing
invested capital for the purpose of the war profits and excess
profits tax, it seems only fair to allow as a deduction in
computing net income the whole amount of the interest paid
during the year.”97 Under the Revenue Act of 1918, Congress
adopted this logic and interest on corporate debt became fully
deductible for the first time.98 This move was considered
momentous and hailed by businesses and practitioners, where
the cap had not only limited deductibility, but also caused
significant confusion for corporate taxpayers.99 As The Wall
91 Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, tit. I, § 12(a), 39 Stat. 756, 768 (“The amount of
interest paid within the year on its indebtedness to an amount of such indebtedness not in
excess of the sum of (a) the entire amount of the paid-up capital stock outstanding at the
close of the year, or, if no capital stock, the entire amount of capital employed in the
business at the close of the year, and (b) one-half of its interest-bearing indebtedness then
outstanding . . . .”); see Revenue Bill Amended, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1916, at XX2.
92 ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, EXCESS PROFITS TAX PROCEDURE 108 (1920).
93 Taxation of Borrowed Capital, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1918, at 12.
94 Id.
95 HOLMES, supra note 63, at 856.
96 Retains Taxation on Issues of Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1918, at 17.
97 H.R. REP. NO . 65-767, at 12–13 (1918).
98 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 234(a)(2), 40 Stat. 1057, 1077 (1919).
99 See, e.g., Income Tax Allowance with Respect to Interest: Where Indebtedness
Exceeds the Capital, Month to Month Variations Must Be Taken into Account, WALL ST. J.,
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Street Journal had commented when the repeal of the cap was
before the Ways and Means Committee, “[h]alf-way concessions
[on the interest deduction cap] . . . were made in the present law,
but the new bill contains the first full measure of justice to
corporations” on this issue.100 Similarly, The New York Times
hailed the change: “Considering that all interest paid by
corporations is subject to tax as income of those to whom it is
paid, the limitation in the old law likewise resulted in double
taxation to the extent that a corporation was not permitted to
deduct interest in arriving at net taxable income.”101
CONCLUSION
The capped origin of the corporate interest deduction
contradicts the notion that a full interest deduction was part of
the original design of the corporate income tax. Indeed, there was
significant concern about bondholder wealth and tax evasion as a
result of the fungibility of debt and equity in 1909, and this
concern continued even after an individual income tax was
enacted. The cap on the interest deduction, although criticized as
“logically indefensible,”102 reflected a pragmatic compromise
between those concerned that corporations would become
over-leveraged to avoid the entity-level tax and those concerned
that not permitting an interest deduction would unfairly
disadvantage corporations that needed such leverage. It was only
removed when the larger issue of taxing wartime profits made
the tax treatment of heavily leveraged companies more
problematic.
This historical context also provides perspective for modern
advocates of a cap on the corporate interest deduction. For
instance, Senator Wyden justifies the proposal contained in his
bill with Republican Senator Dan Coats on similar grounds of
over-leverage and the ease of shifting between equity and debt.
According to the information statement on the bill, the cap is
justified as necessary to “create[] a more even playing field
between corporate debt and equity by cutting the value of
inflation from a corporation’s interest deduction on debt.”103 The
statement continues to note that “[c]utting the value of this tax
June 10, 1918, at 4; Answers to Inquirers; War Revenue Problems, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15,
1918, at 2; Borrowed Funds Allowable as Capital in Cases, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 1918, at
4; ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, INCOME TAX PROCEDURE 584 (1920).
100 The Revenue Bill, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 1918, at 1.
101 Shows Injustices of Revenue Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1919, at 29.
102 ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, INCOME TAX PROCEDURE 459 (1919).
103 RON WYDEN & DAN COATS, THE BIPARTISAN TAX FAIRNESS AND SIMPLIFICATION
ACT OF 2011, available at http://www.wyden.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Wyden-Coats%
20Two% 20Pager%20FINAL1.pdf.
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deduction will reduce a company’s financial incentive to take on
debt.”104

104

Id.

